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International Labour Regulation:
What Have We Really Learnt So Far?
George Tsogas
Can soft regulatory approaches and corporate social responsibility ever be 
substitute methods for pursuing meaningfully across the globe violations of labour 
standards? our analysis shows the limits of country, government, and hard-law 
based international labour regulation, but also the ambiguities and challenges of 
soft labour regulation. We introduce an updated model of international labour 
regulation and create a conceptual framework for analyzing labour regulation. We 
provide some insights into how regulation has developed over the last decades and 
discuss some of the challenges it faces. our assessment of the various regulatory 
regimes is based on the simple premise of whether they can provide a venue for 
workers’ rights violations to be redressed. We aim to provide a broad overview 
and an attempt at generalizing the findings and “lessons learnt” so far from an 
international and comparative industrial relations perspective. 
KEYWordS: soft labour regulation, social clauses, codes of conduct, corporate social 
responsibility, international labour standards
introduction
As the global economy diminishes the regulatory capacity of the nation-state, 
transnational forms of labour regulation are created (or attempted) to fill the vacuum. 
This change of regulatory regimes is neither smooth nor unproblematic. Alternative 
forms of transnational labour regulation are yet to become universally established, 
but the trend is unmistakable. 
Civil society institutions have played a crucial role in that process of recognition; 
campaigning groups, “direct action” and other citizens’ movements, have generated 
previously unheard of awe-inspiring opportunities for social activism at both 
national and transnational levels (Munck and Waterman, 1999; Waterman, 1998 
and 2001). International labour regulation is, for the most part, a campaign-driven 
domain, pursued by various groups and movements and for different purposes, not 
a theoretically or scholarly driven discourse. Numerous publications have examined 
different forms of international labour regulation, such as corporate codes of conduct, 
business social accountability, labelling schemes, child labour and social clauses in 
trade agreements. There is no common theoretical perspective, nor a clear set of 
distinct theoretical approaches. Most writers approach the subject from their own 
disciplinary, institutional, or empirical perspectives; interdisciplinary approaches are 
far less common. Literature has focused primarily on the merits and mechanisms of 
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social clauses and labour regulation instruments; a small segment has concentrated 
on assessing and analyzing the validity of the various arguments raised (Krueger, 
1996; Lee, 1997; Scherrer, 1996; Tsogas, 1999), while very little has been written on 
the actual or potential industrial relations and labour market effects (Tsogas, 2001). 
The aim of this paper is to highlight some of the lessons learnt from existing 
international labour regulation schemes in the last two decades of the 20th century, 
and to draw some policy and research implications. We introduce an updated model of 
international labour regulation and create a conceptual framework for analyzing labour 
regulation. We provide some insights into how regulation has developed over the last 
decades and discuss some of the challenges it faces. Our assessment of the various 
regulatory regimes is based on the simple premise of whether they can provide a venue 
for workers’ rights violations to be redressed. We conclude with some perceptions into 
how international labour regulation could evolve in the 21st century. We aim to provide 
a broad overview and an attempt at generalizing the findings and “lessons learnt” so 
far from an international and comparative industrial relations perspective. 
Inevitably, other aspects of labour regulation, such as trade policy, labour law, and 
developmental or economic perspectives are beyond our scope, and so are broader 
contemporary IR issues, such the effects of globalization, union renewal issues, etc. 
Unfortunately, space limitations do not allow us to get into detailed discussions of 
empirical evidence and the complexities of different forms of regulation. Similarly, another 
limitation on our study is the focus on the formal sector of the economy, leaving aside the 
informal sector where huge segments of the workforce—up to 90% in some developing 
countries—find employment (Schlyter, 2002). International labour regulation that would 
incorporate the informal sector is a challenging area that demands further research. 
an analytical Framework for international labour 
regulation
There is already rich experience in introducing social clauses in international trade 
regimes. Accordingly, there have been a few endeavours to put forward a framework 
of analysis. Stone (1996), alarmed by “the challenge to domestic labour regulation 
of the increasingly international economic and legal order” suggested four models of 
transnational labour regulation “that are emerging in fact”: pre-emptive legislation; 
harmonization of domestic legislation; cross-border monitoring and enforcement; and 
extraterritorial application of domestic law (extraterritorial jurisdiction). She defines 
pre-emptive legislation as being “applicable to persons, business entities, and states 
within a transnational bloc.” Harmonization refers to transnational bodies, such as 
the EU, that seek to harmonize their domestic laws. Finally, cross-border monitoring 
and extraterritorial jurisdiction apply to legal practices in North America. She further 
proceeds to add two dimensions on the four models: multilateral and unilateral 
regulation on the one hand, and integrative and interpenetrative approaches, on the 
other (see table 1). Pre-emptive legislation and harmonization are seen as essentially 
European approaches, integrative in nature, aiming to make disparate regulatory 
systems congruent and consistent over time. In contrast, the North American models 
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(cross-border enforcement and extraterritorial jurisdiction) “employ an interpenetrative 
approach, the temporary incursion of one legal system into the affairs of another” 
(Stone, 1996: 447). Secondly, the four models “can be distinguished as to whether 
they can be implemented unilaterally, or whether they require multilateral action for 
their implementation.” Pre-emptive legislation and cross-border enforcement are 
multilateral “in the sense that they rely for their implementation on actions by several 
countries jointly enforcing a particular labour standard.” In contrast, harmonization and 
extraterritorial jurisdiction “are unilateral in the sense that they can be implemented by 
unilateral action of one country” (Stone, 1996: 469).
Table 1
Four Models of Transnational labour Regulation
  Multilateral regulation unilateral regulation
integrative approaches pre-emptive legislation harmonization
interpenetrative approaches cross-border enforcement extraterritorial jurisdiction
source: stone (1996: 470).
Even though, the above categorization appears to be straightforward, it 
nonetheless creates a rather fuzzy perspective—especially when the interrelation 
between the various models is extrapolated. Additionally, there is no account of 
a major contemporary source of international labour regulation stemming from 
companies that intervene and regulate employment relations in their supply chains 
through voluntary codes of conduct. 
Tsogas (1999) introduced a framework of international labour regulation based 
upon the types of trade relations involved, classified into four types: unilateral, 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral. The unilateral approach involves trade laws of 
a country that contain a social clause embracing all of its trade relations. Examples 
of that are US laws on imports produced by child or prison labour. Additionally, 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), which includes various social labelling schemes 
and voluntary corporate or industry codes of conduct regulating labour standards 
in supply chains, could also be included, as policy measures taken unilaterally by a 
company and involving its intra-firm trade, or traded goods and services through 
supply chains (Mamic, 2004; Murray, 1996; NEF/CIIR, 1997; O’Rourke, 2003; Tsogas 
and IDS, 1998; US Department of Labor, 1996; Utting, 2002a). 
The bilateral level entails social clauses in international trade agreements that regulate 
relations between one country and some of its trade partners. Examples of this approach 
include: (1) the European Communities’ attempt to incorporate labour standards 
provisions during the Lomé II negotiations (1978–79); (2) the inclusion of labour standards 
in US trade legislation, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the 1988 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, the 1991 Andean Trade Preference Act and 
the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement; and (3) and the inclusion of social clauses in the 
GSP of the European Union (EU). Of these schemes, the US and EU GSPs are by far the 
most important (Compa and Vogt, 2001; Frundt, 1998; Tsogas, 2000). 
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The regional track incorporates social clauses in regional trade agreements such 
as the European Union and NAFTA (Compa, 1995 and 1997; Cook and Katz, 1994; 
Elliott, 2003; Griffin, 1997). 
Finally, the multilateral track embraces efforts to incorporate a social clause in 
the World Trade Organization and its predecessor, the GATT—efforts which have so 
far proved unsuccessful (De Wet, 1995; Leary, 1997; Wachtel, 1998; Wolffgang and 
Feuerhake, 2002).
Here, we introduce a further dimension in the above model. In trying to make sense 
of the complexities and ambiguities of the types of regulation that we are seeking to 
present, we must account for an important distinction between “public” instruments 
that link states and seek to regulate their behaviour, on the one hand, and instruments 
that regulate the behaviour of “private” (i.e. non-governmental) parties, on the other. 
That differentiation can be understood and expressed in terms of a fundamental 
dichotomy existing between civil society and CSR-“inspired” i.e. “soft” regulation 
instruments, and other trade law related, i.e. “hard” approaches to international 
labour regulation (Kuruvilla and Verma, 2006; Sisson and Marginson, 2001).
incorporating “Soft” and “Hard” regulation in an analytical Model of 
international labour regulation 
For the purposes of trade-rated social clauses, “hard” approaches rely on trade laws and 
international treaties with legally enforceable measures, where some form of redress 
could be the outcome of a legal challenge or a petition and review process, initiated 
by an interested party (a governmental body, an association, or even an individual). 
The object of the hard approaches is the nation-state and the trade relations that 
it establishes. In contrast, “soft” approaches are voluntary, based not in legal texts 
but at various—usually ad hoc, company or industry specific—policy documents and 
implementation schemes, a “soft” alternative to the “hard,” legally abiding social 
clauses in trade, or even an “outsourced” or “privatized” form of labour regulation 
(O’Rourke, 2003; Burkett, Craig and Link, 2004). Their object is not the state but 
the enterprise or industry or, even more specifically, the individual decision-makers 
within a company. This fundamental difference makes soft regulation a truly unique, 
challenging, and inspiring form of regulation. Another difference between “hard” 
and “soft” approaches rests on who is the primary driving force behind them. “Soft” 
approaches have overwhelmingly been supported, and in certain cases created and 
administered, by civil society institutions. In contrast, social clauses in trade agreements 
have been established and are administered by government departments and agencies, 
intergovernmental organizations and other similar “formal” bureaucracies. 
“Soft” law and its use in international labour regulation have enjoyed considerable 
attention recently (see ILO, 2008). As Duplessis (2008) and Sisson and Marginson 
(2001) note, soft forms of regulation cover a wide area of actors and applications, 
(including even national implementation of EU policies). Here we take a more narrow 
view, looking at soft regulation through the lens of labour standards’ implementation 
in conjunction to international trade relationships. 
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The above characteristics of our international labour regulation framework can 
now be summarized in table 2, named after the four levels of international trade 
relationships that it depicts (Unilateral, Bilateral, Regional, and Multilateral—UBRM). 
Table 2
The ubRM Model of international labour Regulation
regulatory level of trade relations
Subjects objects unilateral bilateral Regional Multilateral
company soft csr/coc framework  un global  
   agreements   compact
state hard usa child and prison gsp (usa, eu) european union wto/gatt  
  labour legislation lomé ii nafta/naalc ilo  
   cbi 
   opic   
   andean trade 
   preference act
In addition to the various regulation schemes identified by Tsogas (1999), we 
have appended here—under the multilateral level, in the soft regulation path—the 
United Nations’ Global Compact that aims to regulate the behaviour of transnational 
corporations through the multilateral role of the UN (Bendell, 2004; Utting, 2002b). 
Similarly, framework agreements are included here as a bilateral and a soft form 
of regulation, negotiated between a multinational company and an international 
sectoral trade union federation (Riisgaard, 2005; Schömann et al., 2008).
advantages and Policy iimplications of the UBrM Model of regulation 
In contrast to Stone’s four models, the UBRM model adopts an open-ended, global 
trade perspective, rather than a more restrictive domestic labour law approach. In 
that respect, it encompasses a different philosophy on global labour issues. First, 
by setting international trade as its base reference point, the UBRM model links up 
with an age-old debate of international industrial relations: how labour standards 
can be regulated, safeguarded, and improved in the context of increased trade 
and mobility of capital. Indeed, linking forms of labour regulation with trade has a 
very long history in IR: since the early 19th century all discussions on international 
labour standards (or comparisons of national labour standards) have been 
conducted in the context and effects of (expanding) international trade. Secondly, 
its open-ended form suggests a positive, forward-looking perspective; international 
labour regulation is not a challenge to established domestic norms, but rather an 
opportunity to be fully exploited. Finally, the UBRM model provides the flexibility to 
account for both actual and emerging schemes to be accounted for, but can also 
envisage new forms of regulation. Could there, for example, be a regional form of 
soft regulation? We will return to the issue of how the UBRM model can stipulate 
new forms of regulation and venues for advocacy and public policy intervention and 
also aid social activism, later. 
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Finally, the UBRM model can also be seen as a regulatory web of the various regimes 
of international labour regulation that a transnational corporation could potentially 
encounter, now or in the future, in its operations across the globe. Which one of these 
schemes would be relevant for a particular company depends upon the industry and 
countries within which it operates, the trade agreements that link those countries with 
the rest of the world, the nature of its supply chains, and, of course, the labour and 
social responsibility policies that the company itself applies. In most cases, there could 
be multiple levels of labour regulation schemes affecting the same company. 
However, whether that threat of multiple exposures to regulatory regimes can be 
an effective measure or is just wishful thinking for those of us who aspire to a well-
functioning international regulatory setting of labour standards, is a matter of further 
detailed research. The crucial issue for those who advocate workers rights, and a 
meaningful protection against the excesses of corporate power, is not whether a 
corporation has a code of conduct in place or if it comes under the scope of NAALC or 
a GSP programme—however important these might be—but whether these schemes 
can provide a venue for worker rights violations to be redressed. This paper critically 
engages with that issue in the pages that follow.
selective assessment of “Hard” regulation: Have social 
Clauses in trade agreements Worked? 
The idea of a social clause in a trade agreement has a long history, predating the 
establishment of the ILO in 1919. The issue has been debated exhaustingly by economists 
and trade theorists (Bhagwati, 1994; Fields, 1990; Piore, 1990; Sengenberger, 
1994), international trade and human rights lawyers (Alston, 1993; Compa, 1993), 
government policymakers (Marshall, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990), international trade 
union bodies (ICFTU, 1998; IMF, 1988) and by a plethora of NGOs and activists. 
the Unilateral level
Social clauses in US trade legislation date back to the late 19th century. The US Tariff 
Act of 1890 banned imports of goods manufactured by prison labour (Zimmerman, 
1992). Section 307 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, extended further the 
provisions of the Tariff Act to products mined or produced by prison, forced or 
indentured labour under penal sanctions. Section 307 remains in force. The main 
weakness of unilaterally enacted social clauses has been the requirement that the task 
of enforcement falls on the Customs Service. In practice, this has been impossible, 
since Customs could only rarely rely on credible knowledge of prison labour cases. 
In the mid-90s, huge controversy was raised over attempts by US Senator Tom 
Harkin in 1989, 1990, 1993, 1995 and 1997, to introduce a bill (“The Child Labor 
Deterrence Act,” or commonly known as the “Harkin bill”) that would prohibit the 
importation of any product made, whole or in part, by children under the age of 15. 
The 1997 bill directed the US Secretary of Labor to make a list of foreign industries 
and their host countries that use child labour in the production of goods exported 
to the United States. Once an industry was identified, the Secretary of the Treasury 
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was to prohibit the importation of such products. However, products from such an 
industry would be allowed into the US, if a US importer signed a certificate of origin 
stating they took reasonable steps to ensure the imported products were not made 
with child labour. Any company or person who violated this law would have faced civil 
and criminal penalties. 
Hertel (2006) detailed the backlash that the Harkin bill created in Bangladesh and 
the controversial results it had over the fate of allegedly thousands of children who 
lost their jobs. 
the Bilateral level
Since 1983, the US Congress has passed several legislative items that contain worker 
rights clauses in bilateral US trade relationships: the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) 
of 1983, the 1984 amendments to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
the 1985 amendments to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA). Of these, most important 
in terms of effectiveness and history has been the GSP programme. The law details 
a petition and review process, where an interested party can petition the US Trade 
Representative asking for a review of workers rights violations in a beneficiary country 
(Tsogas, 2000).
The EU has operated a GSP since 1971. In 1994–95 provisions for granting 
preferential treatment to countries that observe certain labour standards and 
withdrawal of GSP privileges from those that do not, were adopted. The scope of 
the European GSP is twofold: GSP tariff benefits can be withdrawn in cases of forced 
or prison labour, but further tariff concessions can be granted for products produced 
in observance with international labour standards, including freedom of association 
and protection of the right to organize and bargain collectively, and minimum age of 
employment (for a full analysis see Tsogas, 2000). 
Labour rights conditionality under GSPs has provided substantial practical experience 
on the pitfalls and accomplishments of linking trade with labour standards, and can 
contribute valuable lessons. As there has been demonstrated elsewhere (i.e. Tsogas, 2000; 
Frundt, 1998), foreign policy considerations and economic nationalism have dominated 
the selection (or non-selection) of countries for review. Further, the openness of a particular 
country to outside scrutiny, its political relationship with the US/EU, and the links that 
any local trade unions or human rights organizations may have with international bodies 
can also be decisive. The very few countries that were suspended from the US GSP were 
done so either because their governments were disliked by an administration (Nicaragua, 
Syria) or because their trade with the US or EU was totally minimal (Romania, Paraguay, 
Burma, Central African Republic, Liberia, Sudan, Mauritania). 
Inclusion of a social clause in the EU GSP has been very recent. “Reward” of good 
behaviour was only introduced in May 1998. Therefore, the effects and experiences 
that such incorporation would have brought are very limited, in comparison with 
those from the US. The degree to which the scheme offers real economic benefits 
also remains to be explored. 
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Experience has shown that both the EU and the US use their economic and political 
might as a leverage to demand (at least in theory) improvement in conditions of 
employment from their trading partners (nowhere, though, in either scheme is there 
a mention of labour standards in the USA or the EU respectively). In practice, the US 
simply exercised its economic and political power over countries that the government 
dislikes and whenever it deems it appropriate to do so. Similarly, in the EU, the process 
of petition and review is a political matter; any eventual withdrawal of preferences is a 
decision to be taken in the EU Council by “qualifying majority,” where a small group of 
countries can block action. In the EU, so far, there has been a lack of political will even to 
start the review process, let alone proceed with the enforcement of the GSP statutes.
the regional level 
The North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC) does not establish 
any labour standards of its own nor does it provide for harmonization of existing labour 
legislation. The signatory countries (Canada, the USA and Mexico) undertake simply 
to comply with and to enforce their own labour laws fairly. NAALC has not sought 
to introduce new standards or to require any country to match standards prevailing 
elsewhere within the Free Trade Area. Despite this limitation, NAALC is the first 
trade agreement to establish contractual rights and obligations, with trade sanctions 
provisions in the event of violations of labour standards. NAALC has indeed created a 
unique basis for a form of “transnational access to justice” and accountability affording 
the practical opportunity for an interested party to pursue a company for its activities, 
not only in the country where these activities took place but in a third country which 
maintains a trade relationship with the former (Housman, 1994). However, under this 
“transnational access to justice”, labour and environmental issues are at the bottom of 
the hierarchy of access: in practice, they have no form of redress. In that respect, the 
pioneering legal concept of “transnational access to justice” that NAALC introduced 
has unfortunately remained a mainly theoretical possibility and has attracted very little 
attention in the literature. Moreover, the judicial procedures and timetable between 
a judgment and the application of sanctions in the event of a failure to correct the 
grievance are much quicker than the protracted procedures for labour issues. The 
NAALC provisions simply lack the “teeth” to correct violations—with seminars and 
consultations taking the place of trade sanctions. 
selective assessment of “soft” regulation: Corporate 
Codes of Conduct and social responsibility
Social accountability has acquired an immediate significance for many managers, 
activists and scholars in recent years. This has often been the result of unfavourable 
media exposure in both domestic and foreign operations and the response to this by 
increasingly sensitized consumers. High profile brands have been ensnared in public 
controversy and obliged to take emergency remedial action in the glare of publicity. 
The underlying forces, which have shaped this new agenda, are unlikely to go away; 
in fact, they have grown stronger over the dawn years of the 21st century and have 
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transformed, for example, into a general acceptance of the necessity for companies 
to produce social impact and CSR reports, a rarity just five years ago. 
The impact of campaigning on companies has not been the subject of a detailed 
empirical research. Claims that share prices are affected by campaigns have been 
difficult to sustain against the general turmoil of markets (Ettenson et al., 2006; 
Klein, Smith and John, 2004). This does not, of course, mean that there is no impact 
on company performance. And crisis management to respond to campaigns can be 
unsettling and disruptive for senior management and the decision-making process. 
Unmanaged or mismanaged issues can spiral out of control, and lead to consumer 
boycotts or less tangible forms of brand avoidance. 
Corporate codes of conduct avoid one thorny issue associated with other forms 
of regulation, but raise a host more. The thorny issue is that of the extra-territorial 
impact of legislation enacted by governments in the developed world with the aim 
of altering the behaviour of actors—companies and governments—in developing 
countries (Utting, 2007). The advantage of corporate codes in this respect is that it 
could be argued that they reflect: (mostly middle-class) “consumer choice”—in that 
companies are responding to the demands of their customers for “ethically-sourced” 
products, and “purchaser choice”—in that companies can source from where they 
like and on the conditions they can negotiate. 
Unlike previous eras, during the 1990s and especially through the early years of 
the 21st century, there has been an explosion of voluntary codes dealing specifically 
with labour regulation issues (OECD, 2001; Tulder and Kolk, 2001). Corporate 
codes of conduct, intended to regulate the behaviour, practices and standards of 
the participants in supply chains, have assumed a new prominence because of the 
problems in developing and enforcing effective multilateral or industry-specific 
regulation of labour standards—be this in the WTO, ILO or via industry initiatives. For 
the most part, codes have so far embraced retailers, owners of high-profile brands, 
and in some cases both where these overlap and where brands own their own 
manufacturing facilities in developing countries. Industrial manufacturers from the 
developed countries have generally not figured in the debate as yet.
Codes represent one of the first steps that companies can take when tackling the 
issue of how to respond to criticism of standards in their supply chains. Codes have also 
allowed companies to respond to the challenges of NGOs by initiating improvements 
immediately. They have the advantage—for companies—of being under corporate 
control and subject to internal compliance procedures. Where other parties are involved, 
such as trade unions via negotiation or NGOs via consultation, this control may be diluted, 
but the code may acquire a higher degree of external acceptance and legitimacy. 
Codes not only offer a number of benefits for all actors engaged, they may also 
be the only form of regulation which can be realistically developed in the short-term. 
However, scepticism about codes on the part of NGOs and trade unions means that 
companies need to do more than simply issue a text without specifying effective 
means for implementation and monitoring, and some procedure for verifying that 
implementation is taking place (Barrientos and Smith, 2007). 
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The style and format of codes vary considerably but their main components 
generally are: prohibitions on child labour, either in terms of national law, their own 
definition or sometimes no precise definition; prohibitions on forced or indentured 
labour; prohibitions on discrimination based on race, religion or ethnic origin, 
prohibitions on certain types of disciplinary practice (physical or psychological 
punishment or unreasonable fines); provisions on health and safety, both at the 
workplace and in some cases in employee accommodation; provisions on pay, hours 
of work, rest breaks and time-off, and the regulation of overtime; provisions on the 
rights to organize and engage in collective bargaining. The precise standards required 
vary considerably, with some codes referring to the “core” ILO Conventions, some 
simply to compliance with local laws and regulations, and others making less specific 
provisions. Many codes contain a blanket provision requiring compliance with all 
applicable national laws and regulations. 
The response by NGOs, governments, sectoral partnerships and individual 
companies to this evolving environment has given rise to a proliferation of initiatives, 
and a welter of public relations activity on the part of companies. The outcome 
has been a lack of transparency as to the institutions involved and the virtues and 
drawbacks of the numerous schemes currently in existence or proposed. Schemes 
such as the SA8000 or the AA1000 are positioning themselves as universal standards 
for social accountability (for a review see Tsogas, 2001: 72–76). 
the New tripartism of “Soft” regulation: Companies, NGos  
and trade Unions
One of the most interesting characteristics of the emerging “soft” regulation is 
the opportunity for NGOs, companies and trade unions to form new types of 
tripartite cooperation. NGOs have become increasingly willing to adopt a strategy 
of “constructive engagement” with manufacturers and retailers as a tactical and 
possibly a strategic option. This has been based, however, on influence won 
through high-profile media exposure of leading companies and the fact that such 
exposure has been seen to have damaging effects on carefully and expensively 
crafted company and brand images. In essence, they are succeeding in bringing 
companies to the negotiating table, at a time when trade unions find it increasingly 
difficult to do so.
Many companies have also—sometimes after a sharp internal debate—decided 
to engage with NGOs rather than to seek to ride out campaigns or mount a legal 
challenge to refute NGO claims, although this has been an option which has been 
used where claims have not been wholly substantiated or have been misleading. 
The existence of government-sponsored initiatives, such as the UK’s Ethical Trading 
Initiative (ETI), the mixed composition of the advisory board of the Council on 
Economic Priorities Accreditation Agency (CEPAA), and the US. Apparel Industry 
Partnership all testify to the fact that some NGOs and companies have found 
mutual advantage in working together, with trade unions, to address the issue of 
employment standards. 
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the role of trade Unions
Trade unions participating in joint initiatives (as opposed to negotiating an agreement) 
face an unchartered territory. In particular, as the historic representatives of labour, 
and as the institutional representative of workers within the ILO, they are concerned 
at being displaced by NGOs in such joint initiatives—as well as being uneasy about 
engaging with business on a non-negotiating basis. The international trade union 
movement, with its central call for the inclusion of core labour standards in trade 
agreements, has been somewhat sidelined by the focus on corporate initiatives. Trade 
union activists and representatives have tended to regard corporate efforts as, at 
best, inadequate to the task at hand and, at worst, tainted by the suspicion that 
companies are only interested in massaging their reputations. Codes of conduct 
have been seen as “privatizing” labour regulation—the proper subject of the state 
and official international bodies such as the ILO. Voluntary codes of conduct have 
been regarded with particular scepticism. Trade unions would prefer a system of 
multilateral regulation, in which trade and human and labour rights are tied together, 
with membership of the WTO made conditional on acceptance of basic rights (Wick, 
2003). Trade unions are also concerned that issues of freedom of association may 
take last place in any action agenda, and possibly be dropped altogether once the 
more “controversial” issues, such as child labour, have been addressed. 
But there are also some new opportunities for trade unionism. The lack of progress 
at multilateral level has prompted trade unions to develop alternative ways of tackling 
these issues, and these have been in train and gathering momentum over the past 
few years. Both in North America and Europe, trade unions have now begun to 
support and participate, through negotiations, in a new wave of activity that seeks to 
address the issue of labour standards at industry and corporate level through direct 
contact with employers and collaboration with NGOs. In some cases, this has evolved 
into efforts to negotiate codes of conduct with employers, even though substantial 
difficulties remain (Miller, 2004). Even though examples of negotiated codes are 
still small in number, there is already some movement in that direction. Important 
examples include Danone in 1988 (the very first one), the hotels chain ACCOR (the 
second, in 1995) and then an acceleration in the number of agreements signed per 
year to reach 50 by the end of 2006. Among these are the Swedish furniture company 
IKEA (1998); the Italian toy manufacturer Artsana (Chicco brand) in 1999, the banana 
company Chiquita, the German stationery producers Faber-Castell and Staedler, 
oil companies in Norway (Statoil), Italy (ENI) and Russia (Lukoil), the car producers 
Volkswagen, Daimler-Chrysler, Renault and Peugeot-Citroën, the Spanish and French 
electricity producers Endesa and EDF, the telecom companies in Spain (Telefonica) and 
Greece (OTE), and retailers in France (Carrefour) and Sweden (H&M) (Tsogas and IDS, 
1998: 87–90, Schömann et al., 2008). 
Indeed a negotiated approach is wholly in accord with labour movement traditions 
in this field, and in particular in line with the efforts by garment unions in the US 
in the 1920s and 1930s to establish “joint liability,” in which manufacturers were 
obliged to accept responsibility for conditions in their contractors (Howard, 1997). 
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The issue of enforcement and the legal status of agreements with trade unions is 
a major area still in need of clarification—although the fact that collective agreements 
in the UK are not legally binding simplifies this issue somewhat for British participants. 
In Mainland Europe, there is a strict hierarchy of agreements and a division of labour 
between trade unions and elected workforce representatives as to who can sign what 
type of agreement. Agreements may also be legally binding, depending on the status 
of the signatory parties. In some European jurisdictions collective agreements not only 
apply as between the employer and employees (as in the UK via incorporation) but 
also establish a contractual relationship between the signatory employer or employers’ 
association and the signatory trade union. As a consequence, in theory, a company could 
be brought before a national court for breaching its contractual obligations towards a 
trade union on the grounds that it violated this agreement in another jurisdiction. For this 
reason, many agreed codes are likely to take the form of accords rather than contractual 
obligations; this would at least allow concentration on the substance of the issues, rather 
than involving lawyers in phrasing texts which might have to withstand challenge in the 
courts—a process which can be destructive of efforts to reach agreement. Nonetheless, 
most agreements are still at an early stage of implementation. As such, many have 
not yet encountered the problems of enforcement that have characterized voluntary 
codes of conduct. But, negotiated codes will also be confronted with many of the policy 
issues and dilemmas that have confronted those in the corporate sector who have been 
attempting to put voluntary codes into practice. For example, what to do about non-
conformance, and what remedial programmes should be in place; what to do about 
employees in the informal sector whose status could be prejudiced by a concentration of 
work in more easily monitored centralized industrial plants. 
In Europe, the institution of the European Works Council (EWC) may also offer 
a forum in which such issues could be aired at company level. Both employer and 
employee sides on EWCs are often eager to find international themes on which 
consensus could be achieved, and a discussion on a code of conduct or labour 
standards might offer such a terrain (Edwards et al., 2007). As yet, activity in this area 
is minimal and many employers could well be reluctant to accord a formal status to 
such discussions, fearing that it might set a precedent for other forms of European-
level bargaining that they are eager to avoid. Employee members of EWCs would also 
need extensive support and advice. At present, both national and international trade 
unions are severely stretched, finding it difficult to service existing EWCs. They would 
be hard-pressed to devote resources to what might still appear to be a peripheral 
issue to many employee representatives. However, this might be an area in which 
NGOs could work to support trade union initiatives by offering expert advice, and 
many EWC agreements contain provisions that allow such advice to be drawn on. 
For many companies, on the other hand, working with trade unions is not 
something rooted in their own cultures and practices. Most individuals involved with 
ethical sourcing in companies have had no exposure within their own organizations to 
employee representatives. For them, the issue has been one of responding to perceived 
or actual customer concerns, to lobbying by NGOs, and to initiating action through 
quality mechanisms, not employee relations’ structures. The institutions in which 
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companies, NGOs, consultants and trade unions sit together have not been operating 
sufficiently long enough to establish whether these experiments can succeed.
Each side has still to find a comfortable and legitimate role within a new tripartitism 
based entirely on voluntarism and “soft” regulation of labour; one in which NGOs may 
have to recognize that companies may not be able to make the radical changes which 
they might wish for as swiftly as they would like, one in which companies recognize that 
NGOs should not be drawn into quiescence—however convenient that might appear—
and one in which trade unions are not the de facto representatives of the workers 
nor rely on collective bargaining to bring about improvement of working conditions. 
Unless mutual learning and some accommodation take place, simply bringing together 
organizations with different views and agendas—and subject to different exigencies—
will not resolve problems but simply internalize them for a period. 
Conclusions
Our analysis has shown the limits of country, government, and hard-law based 
international labour regulation, but also the ambiguities and challenges of soft 
labour regulation. 
On the one hand, rooted in traditional, state-based employment systems, 20th 
century labour regulation (designed by and for social actors and problems of the late 
19th and early 20th centuries) has been proven ill suited to tackle labour rights violations 
in the global economy era. The ILO was set up in 1919 to provide a solution for a late 
19th and early 20th century “social question”: to dissuade working classes in developed 
capitalist economies from embracing revolutionary ideas. Welfare capitalism, collective 
bargaining, and state-sponsored tripartism worked exceptionally well throughout the 
20th century for the formal economies of the “U-labour” (unionized and unionizable 
workforce, see Waterman, 2001). But, in the 21st century new forms of work go far 
beyond both the “U” form, and the global economy makes full use of the informal 
sector. On a global scale, the informal economy is the norm, not the exception, nor 
does it rest any longer at the periphery of global economic activity. Yet, current forms 
of labour regulation apply only to formal economic structures, leaving aside that vast 
majority of working people. That made some sense in the industrial era, where the 
industrial worker was the locomotive of economic growth, but as the global economy 
now engulfs all forms of work (formal, informal, precarious) current labour regulation 
is left without an object. 21st century international labour regulation must incorporate 
the informal sector. However, that cannot be done by thinking and acting within the 
same reference constraints; the state does not have to be the only legitimate source 
of work regulation. People in developing countries, for example,—in the near total 
absence of regulatory enforcement mechanisms—regulate their work through the 
collective entities to which they belong (neighbourhood, village, tribe, social group, 
etc); they certainly do not wait for the government. Labour regulation in the 21st century 
(especially if the informal economy is to be included) has to be understood in wider 
terms, involving the social formations people join through and for their work. And what 
has hard labour regulation achieved through social clauses? Lack of openness to public 
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scrutiny, slow processes, and ultimately complete lack of redress offered to victims of 
labour standards violations, have marked its more than 20 years’ experience. 
Even though further research could clarify this crucial matter, it seems that we have 
now reached—and passed—a turning point; those in civil society who are genuinely 
concerned about workers’ rights and social development have opted to go directly 
after the corporate culprits and pressure them to act upon labour standards abuses 
that take place in their own supply chains, rather than rely on what they perceive to 
be impersonal bureaucracies to conduct country reviews, reports and hold summits. 
That movement, problematic and scary to some as it might be, brings about a 
sea change on how we understand and deal with employment and its protection. 
Of course, that does not mean that hard-won and well-functioning mechanisms 
of labour regulation are to be abandoned—it is by no means an either/or situation 
(Arthurs, 2001). But the trend is already well established and the implications can be 
immense, but yet quite undetermined by academic research. 
On the other hand, soft regulatory approaches and CSR have their own 
shortcomings. Can they ever be a substitute method for pursuing meaningfully 
across the globe violations of labour standards? For the time being, we can only 
conclude that hard law and social clauses in trade agreements have been proven to 
be completely unable to deliver. 
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rÉsumÉ
Le droit international du travail : qu’avons-nous vraiment 
appris jusqu’ici ?
Au fur et à mesure que l’économie mondiale réduit la capacité de réglementation 
de l’état-nation, des formes supranationales de législation ouvrière apparaissent (ou 
cherchent à apparaître) afin de combler le vide. Cette modification du régime de 
réglementation n’est ni douce, ni imprévisible. Des formes alternatives de réglementation 
transnationales sont encore loin de revêtir un caractère universel, mais la tendance est 
évidente et ne trompe personne. 
Les institutions de la société civile ont joué un rôle crucial dans ce processus de 
reconnaissance, de formation de groupes activistes, d’action directe et d’autres 
démarches des citoyens. Auparavant, elles avaient déjà créé des occasions inédites et 
terrifiantes d’activisme social, cela à la fois aux niveaux national et transnational. La 
législation internationale du travail est en grande partie un domaine propre à l’agitation, 
poursuivie par divers mouvements et groupements, visant des objectifs différents, 
n’étant pas de l’ordre du discours conduit de manière théorique ou académique. 
Le but de cet essai est de mettre en relief quelques leçons apprises des schémas existants 
de réglementation internationale du travail au cours des deux dernières décennies du 
20e siècle et en tirer quelques implications au plan de la recherche et de la formulation 
de politiques. Nous présentons un modèle révisé de la réglementation internationale du 
travail et nous élaborons un cadre de référence conceptuel pour analyser la législation 
du travail. Nous fournissons aussi des indications sur la manière dont la réglementation 
s’est développée au cours des dernières décennies et analysons les défis qui se présentent. 
Notre appréciation des différents régimes se fonde sur la simple prémisse qui consiste 
à se demander s’ils fournissent ou non une possibilité de redressement des violations 
des droits des travailleurs. Nos concluons en faisant part de notre vision sur la manière 
dont la législation internationale peut se développer au 21e siècle. Nous cherchons à 
dégager une vue globale et nous tentons une généralisation des conclusions et des 
leçons apprises à ce jour, cela dans une perspective de relations du travail comparées et 
internationales. 
Nous avons déjà présenté un cadre de référence en matière de législation internationale 
du travail en retenant les types de rapports commerciaux impliqués, classés sous quatre 
rubriques : unilatéraux, bilatéraux, régionaux et multilatéraux, que nous appelons 
UBRM (Tsogas, 1999). Nous introduisons ici une dimension additionnelle. En cherchant 
à comprendre la complexité et l’ambiguïté des types de réglementation que nous 
essayons d’introduire, nous devons tenir compte de la distinction importante entre les 
instruments de « politique publique » qui lient les gouvernements et cherche à encadrer 
leur comportement, d’une part, et les instruments qui réglementent la conduite des 
intervenants privés (non étatiques), d’autre part. Cette distinction peut être comprise et 
traduite en termes d’une dichotomie fondamentale qu’on retrouve entre la société civile 
et les instruments de réglementation douce, qui s’inspirent du concept de citoyenneté 
corporative, ou d’autre législation commerciale associée, c’est-à-dire, dans ce cas, des 
approches « dures » en matière de réglementation internationale du travail. 
Les caractéristiques décrites plus haut de notre cadre de référence eu égard à la 
réglementation internationale du travail peuvent être résumées dans notre cadre 
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d’analyse UBRM. Notre analyse met en évidence les faiblesses d’une réglementation 
internationale du travail qui se base sur la législation propre à un pays, à un 
gouvernement, ou encore une législation dite « dure ». Elle montre aussi les ambiguïtés 
et les défis d’une législation du travail dite « douce ». 
D’un côté, en étant ancrée dans des systèmes d’emploi basés sur l’état ou la tradition, 
la législation du travail du 20e siècle (conçue par et pour des acteurs sociaux, pour 
régler des problèmes des 19e et 20e siècles) s’est avérée mal pensée pour faire face à des 
violations des droits des travailleurs dans une ère d’économie mondiale. L’OIT a été mise 
sur pied en 1919 pour offrir une solution à la « question sociale » de la fin du 19e et du 
début du 20e siècle, c’est-à-dire pour chercher à dissuader les classes laborieuses dans les 
économies capitalistes développées d’embrasser la cause révolutionnaire. Le capitalisme 
social, la négociation collective et le tripartisme initié par l’état ont relativement bien 
fonctionné à travers le 20e siècle pour les économies institutionnalisées caractérisées par 
une main-d’œuvre syndiquée ou syndicable (voir Waterman, 2001). Mais au cours du 
21e siècle, de nouvelles formes d’emploi vont bien au-delà de ces deux caractéristiques 
et l’économie mondiale fait un usage complet du secteur informel. Sur une échelle 
mondiale, l’économie informelle devient la norme et non l’exception, non plus qu’elle 
se tienne à la périphérie de l’activité économique mondiale. Encore que des formes 
actuelles de réglementation du travail s’appliquent aux structures économiques 
officielles, en maintenant à l’écart la grande majorité des gens en emploi. La législation 
internationale du travail du 21e siècle doit intégrer le secteur informel. Cependant, 
cela ne peut se faire en demeurant à l’intérieur des mêmes contraintes au plan de la 
réflexion et de l’action; l’état ne doit pas être la seule source légitime de réglementation 
du travail. La réglementation du travail au cours du 21e siècle (plus particulièrement, 
si l’économie informelle doit être retenue) doit être envisagée dans des termes plus 
vastes, impliquant les groupements sociaux auxquels les gens adhèrent par le biais de 
leur travail ou pour les besoins de ce dernier. Alors on peut se demander qu’est-ce 
qu’une législation « dure » du travail a bien pu accomplir par des dispositions d’ordre 
social? L’absence d’ouverture au regard du public, des processus lents et, à la fin, un 
manque complet de réparation des torts causés aux victimes des violations des règles du 
travail ont caractérisé l’expérience des vingt dernières années ou plus qu’on a vécue.
Même si des recherches subséquentes pouvaient clarifier cette situation critique, il 
semble que nous ayons franchi (et dépassé) un point tournant; ceux qui dans la société 
civile sont vraiment préoccupés par les droits ouvriers et le développement social ont 
choisi de s’adresser directement aux entreprises coupables et de faire pression sur elles 
pour qu’elles agissent sur les violations des normes du travail, qui surviennent dans 
leurs propres chaînes de l’offre, plutôt que de se fier à ce qu’ils perçoivent comme des 
bureaucraties impersonnelles devant produire des révisions, des rapports et tenir des 
« rencontres au sommet ».
Cette action, aussi problématique et ambitieuse qu’elle puisse être, apporte avec elle 
un changement de cap sur la manière dont on comprend le phénomène de l’emploi 
et sa protection, de même que sur la manière dont on le traite. Sans doute, cela ne 
veut pas dire que des mécanismes obtenus de haute lutte et qui fonctionnent bien 
en matière de réglementation du travail soient délaissés – ce n’est en aucune façon 
une situation de « ou l’un ou l’autre ». Cependant, la tendance est bien en place et les 
implications peuvent s’avérer importantes, quoiqu’elles ne demeurent pas encore tout 
à fait circonscrites par la recherche de nature scientifique. 
D’un autre côté, et bien entendu, les approches en matière de réglementation douce et 
la responsabilité sociale des entreprises comportent des limites. Peut-il exister à l’échelle 
de la planète une méthode alternative de sévir de façon significative en matière de 
violations des normes minimales du travail ? Pour le moment, nous pouvons seulement 
conclure qu’une législation contraignante et des dispositions sociales dans les accords 
de commerce ont démontré qu’elles demeuraient totalement incapables de concevoir 
ce genre de méthode.
MOTS-CLéS : directive non obligatoire, dispositions sociales, codes de conduite, 
responsabilité sociale d’entreprise, normes internationales du travail
resumen
Regulación internacional del trabajo : ¿Qué hemos realmente 
aprendido hasta ahora?
¿Es que los enfoques de regulación ligera y de responsabilidad social empresarial 
pueden ser métodos sustitutos para profundizar significativamente la comprensión 
de violaciones de las normas laborales que conlleva la globalización? Nuestro análisis 
muestra los limites de país, de gobierno y de la regulación laboral internacional basada 
en cargadas legislaciones, pero también las ambigüedades y los cuestionamientos de 
la regulación laboral ligera. Introducimos una actualización del modelo de regulación 
laboral internacional y creamos un marco conceptual para analizar la regulación laboral. 
Proporcionamos algunas pistas sobre cómo se ha desarrollado la regulación en las 
últimas décadas y discutimos algunos de los retos que ella enfrenta. Nuestra evaluación 
de los diferentes regímenes de regulación se basa en la simple premisa de saber si ellos 
pueden dar lugar a que la violación de derechos laborales sea enmendada. Nuestro 
objetivo fue de ofrecer una amplia visión general y una tentativa de generalización de 
los resultados y de las “lecciones aprendidas” hasta el momento desde una perspectiva 
internacional y comparativa de las relaciones industriales.
PALABRAS CLAVES : regulación laboral ligera, clausulas sociales, códigos de conducta, 
responsabilidad social empresarial, normas internacionales del trabajo 
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